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Abstract—The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in
the European Union is the most famous recently enacted privacy
regulation. Despite of the regulation’s legal, political, and techno-
logical ramifications, relatively little research has been carried out
for better understanding the GDPR’s practical implications for
requirements engineering and software architectures. Building
on a grounded theory approach with close ties to the Finnish
software industry, this paper contributes to the sealing of this gap
in previous research. Three questions are asked and answered
in the context of software development organizations. First, the
paper elaborates nine practical constraints under which many
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) often operate when
implementing solutions that address the new regulatory demands.
Second, the paper elicits nine regulatory requirements from the
GDPR for software architectures. Third, the paper presents an
implementation for a software architecture that complies both
with the requirements elicited and the constraints elaborated.
Index Terms—Data protection, privacy, requirements engineer-
ing, software architectures, regulation, law, GDPR, SMEs, SOA
I. INTRODUCTION
The famous GDPR became enforceable in the European
Union (EU) in late May 2018 [1].1 The regulation’s polit-
ical preparations as well as its later legal enforcement were
received with both great enthusiasm and great anxiety. Yet,
a familiar theme during the past two years or so was the ill-
preparation of many companies to live in a post-GDPR world.
Even in Finland, where data protection regulation already had
a relatively strong legislative ground, many companies were
either unaware of the GDPR’s implications or reluctant to
implement the changes required [2]. The same theme has
continued even after over a year of the GDPR’s enforcement.
While questionable, unethical, and possibly illegal data col-
lection practices may explain some of the background behind
the continuance, another explanation culminates to the fact
that only little technical guidance has been provided by the
EU for implementing the changes required. Even the GDPR’s
requirements are still somewhat unclear and much debated.
These points extend to academic research. Although some
previous work has been done on eliciting requirements from
the GDPR [3], [4], the understanding of the regulation’s full
scope is still in its infancy. Thus, there is a clear need for
a hands-on demonstration on how the GDPR’s regulatory de-
mands are implemented in the contemporary software industry.
1 This paper is based on the M.Sc. thesis of Kalle Hjerppe.
Such a demonstration cannot rely on requirements engineer-
ing alone; something must be said also about the context
within which day-to-day software engineering operates, and
something concrete must be shown in order to demonstrate
the plausibility of the requirements elicited. These practical
aspects are particularly important for SMEs [5]. While large
companies have vast resources for maintaining in-house legal
departments, using consultants, and hiring dedicated privacy
engineers, most smaller companies operate with tight budgets
and other related constraints that influence also the technical
implementation of data protection and privacy solutions.
Given this practical motivation, the paper presents a case
study on implementing requirements elicited from the GDPR
in a Finnish SME. In addition to the framing to SMEs and
the Finnish software industry, the paper’s scope is restricted
to software architectures in general and so-called service-
oriented architectures (SOAs) in particular. With this framing,
the following three research questions (RQs) are examined:
• RQ1: What practical constraints SMEs operating with
SOAs typically face when implementing solutions for
complying with the GDPR’s new regulatory demands?
• RQ2: What requirements does the GDPR imply for SOAs
operated by SMEs, and how these can be elicited?
• RQ3: How the requirements elicited from the GDPR can
be reasonably implemented in SOAs under the practical
constraints that many software development SMEs face?
The structure of the paper’s remainder follows these three
research questions. After the opening Section II that briefly
outlines the background and related work, Section III elab-
orates the context, methods, and the constraints identified,
Section IV presents the requirements elicitation, and Section V
illustrates the main changes to the company’s software ar-
chitectures. The final Section VI summarizes the answers to
the research questions, notes limitations and a few practical
challenges faced, and pinpoints directions for further research.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Requirements engineering first appeared in the software
engineering literature in the early 1980s. It was already back
then framed with the classical dual questions about software
validation (“building the right product”) and the verification
(“building the product right”) of the software produced [6]. In
a traditional software engineering setup the former question
connotes with an elicitation of requirements from stakeholders.
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The latter question includes assertions about whether the
requirements elicited match the implementation produced, and
further whether the implementation meets quality attributes
deemed as relevant. Both questions are notoriously difficult to
answer in practice. In fact, requirements engineering is among
the fundamental factors in the complex causal constellation
through which software projects fail [7]. Furthermore, software
engineering is increasingly facing also various difficult societal
requirements [8]. Software engineering should innovate but
still stay ethical and sometimes even conservative; software
should encourage and empower at the same time as it should
curtain the negative effects from these; software should be safe
and secure but still usable and easily accessible; and so forth.
Legal regulations are the primary force through which these
new requirements enter into the realm of software engineering.
Information security is one thing. Although there has long
been some regulatory requirements about (information) se-
curity, many of these have been limited to some particular
software industry sectors. Privacy is another thing. When
compared to security, privacy and data protection regulations
are relatively new—the GDPR is the first regulation covering a
large geographic region. Even though there is still a lot of room
for improvements, there have long been also many frame-
works, tools, guidelines, and checklists for meeting different
security requirements [9], [10]. In some cases, even formal
audits and certification are possible. In contrast, very little
guidance exists for addressing requirements from the GDPR
and other emerging regulations for privacy and data protection.
Notions such as “privacy-by-design”, “privacy-by-default”,
and “data-protection-by-design” frequently appear in the legal
literature [2], [11], [12], but the work has just recently begun
on how the required paradigm change could be achieved
in software engineering and computer science in general.
While there are some good practical examples, including those
related to distributed software architectures [13], [14], there
exists also some empirical evidence that software engineers are
even actively discouraged from making privacy a priority [15].
Web privacy is a good example about the latter point. In this
domain the GDPR’s impacts have so far been debatable at
best, and the potential explanations include a lack of practical
guidance and a false sense of compliance [16]. By and large,
these basic explanations presumably generalize also to other
domains and software industry sectors. In order to improve the
situation, requirements engineering should be in a focal point.
After all: when it is unclear whether the right product is being
built, it is also unlikely that the product is being built right.
Requirements engineering contains numerous frameworks,
tools, and guidelines for eliciting requirements from stake-
holders. However, these are largely just emerging for eliciting
requirements from regulations instead of stakeholders. A basic
problem with regulations is that the question is not only
about elicitation of requirements from the regulations but also
about legal compliance to the regulations [17]. By impli-
cation, the elicitation should be especially rigorous and the
requirements particularly sharp. In theory, a sensible approach
might involve both lawyers and software engineers, but even
this collaborative approach contains plenty of problems. For
instance, both lawyers and engineers speak their own more
or less formal languages but with vastly different dialects;
both typically have only a limited understanding about each
other’s domains and knowledge; and so forth [18]. Even when
such obstacles could be remedied, it should be emphasized
that small software development enterprises seldom have the
resources to collaborate with lawyers during requirements
elicitation—let alone in the whole development process dur-
ing which stakeholders should be involved in agile software
development. Further problems are caused by the fact that
like all requirements, also requirements elicited from legal
regulations change over time [19]. Stakeholders and users may
also have non-regulatory security, privacy, and data protection
requirements of their own [20]. Given these and other subtle
problems, how is it possible to address the GDPR in practice?
Because the fundamental question about legal requirements
remains more or less unaddressed in the existing literature, a
so-called argumentative requirements engineering [21], [22]
provides a sensible theoretical frame for the present work.
Thus, in what follows, the solution proposed (RQ3) is argued
to comply with the GDPR given a set of practical constraints
(RQ1) and requirements elicited from the regulation (RQ2).
Actual compliance is left unaddressed. There are two layers:
“The cost to maintain this argumentation-based treatment
of compliance though, is the introduction of additional
elements in the models, which may result in comprehen-
sion bottlenecks. We address this problem by splitting the
model in 2 layers: the first (argumentation) layer models
a discussion concerning a compliance solution; the second
(solution) layer models the actual compliance solution.
The argumentation layer records the structure and other
information about the discussions evaluating changes of
the solution layer.” [21, p. 281]
Here, the argumentative layer addresses the constraints
and requirements. The solution layer operates with concrete
software architectures based on the arguments put forward.
This dual layering is generally important for underlining the
intrinsic value of argumentative requirements engineering in
the present context: if a company must legally defend its data
protection and privacy practices, both layers are necessary.
III. CONTEXT
A. The Case Company
The analysis presented builds on a case study about the
design of GDPR-induced changes for software architectures
in a particular company. The company itself is a fairly typical,
already well-established SME in the Finnish software industry.
The case company’s business model relies on what might
be called “software-engineering-as-a-service” model: the com-
pany implements software projects for customers. In essence,
each project produces a service, which is deployed on behalf of
a customer on the company’s deployment infrastructure. Agile
software development practices are used during implemen-
tation. Different software modules and frameworks are used
extensively to increase flexibility and reusability. While each
project typically has a fixed length, these may be sometimes
further developed. Customers usually also outsource mainte-
nance tasks to the company. Increasingly, the company is also
using so-called DevOps practices to improve different delivery
and maintenance tasks. All in all, the case company can be
interpreted as a typical representative in its respective domain.
B. Approach
The research methodology builds on the so-called (con-
structivist) grounded theory approach [23], [24]. In general,
grounded theory approaches are valuable for understanding
how the GDPR is implemented in practice [25]. The research
methodology adheres also to the principles of so-called design
science [5], [26]. In other words, the goal was to design
changes to concrete software architectures. These changes not
only take regulatory requirements into account, but also con-
sider the larger organizational, infrastructural, technological,
and business constraints. By implicitly following the so-called
twin peaks model for requirements and architectures [27],
the architectural changes were thus “constructed” through
“data” from the GDPR as well as from prior knowledge
within the case company—and within comparable companies
in the Finnish software industry between 2014 and 2017.
Although no systematic framework was used for dealing with
the secondary, context-specific material, the engineering of the
architectural solutions was not unsystematic. The following
five auxiliary “data sources” are worth briefly remarking.
First and foremost, the choices are based on knowledge
about the existing software architectures. For implementing
the changes to these, the architectures were systematically
analyzed together with the old design documents and re-
quirements that led to the architectures. Second, the pre-
GDPR legislation in Finland was analyzed together with the
Finnish governmental guidance for information and software
security. This guidance (abbreviated as VAHTI; see [10]) was
used for addressing some of the GDPR’s security-specific
requirements. Third, discussions were held with some existing
customers, and an external law firm was consulted regarding
a few non-technical data protection questions. Fourth, all
concrete changes went through code review and the design
choices through more general peer review within the case
company. Last, the changes were thoroughly tested, as always.
Given these information sources, all typical design evaluation
methods [26, p. 86] were used except experimental methods.
C. Constraints
Both the company’s internal software engineering practices
and the external business factors place constraints for imple-
menting the requirements elicited from the GPDR’s articles.
The following nine constraints (C) were identified prior to the
requirements elicitation and architectural design phases:
• The heterogeneity of customers (C1) imposes some con-
straints because there are both new customers and old
customers with their already implemented projects. Par-
ticularly new customers may bring additional require-
ments regarding the software frameworks used in a
project. In terms of the GDPR, the important implication
is that the software architecture and its data structures
cannot be tied to a single database holding personal data.
• A technological dependency (C2) constraint follows di-
rectly from Constraint C1. In other words, the require-
ments of both new and old customers influences the
technological choices made. As always, there is also a
certain price to pay from a commitment to a particular
technology, including any software framework adopted.
• The size of projects (C3) carried out in the company
brings a further constraint. These range from small one-
month projects to large undertakings spanning several
years with annual budgets of hundreds of thousands of
euros. Although the largest projects are excluded from
the present work, C3 implies that the architectural design
should scale at least to middle-range and small projects.
• External investments (C4) must be also taken into ac-
count. While it might be possible to design and im-
plement a perfect-fit architecture for a single customer,
such an architecture unlikely scales to projects of other
customers. From the company’s perspective, it is thus
beneficial to design and implement as much functionality
as is possible into unified frameworks shared in all
projects. Due to the company’s business model, licensing,
intellectual property, and related aspects are also a part of
C4, although these are excluded from the present work.
• The variety of servers (C5) is one of the infrastructural
characteristics that is particularly important in terms of
data protection [28]. The final services implemented
use caching servers and load balancers. The application
servers may be distributed. Databases are typically de-
ployed on servers of their own. Furthermore, a particular
emphasis should be placed on the so-called staging envi-
ronment, which is used during development and testing
to replicate an environment used for the final deploy-
ment. Consequently, personal data may scatter to multiple
servers, and the staging environment should hold the
same data as the deployment environment. These aspects
impose important constraints that should be carefully
addressed to meet the requirements from the GDPR.
• A need to update older systems (C6) is also apparent
because data protection has been considered with varying
scrutiny in older projects and their architectures. While
these conform with the older data protection legislation
in Finland, it is beneficial for the company to unify
all related functionality into a single umbrella solution.
Obviously, the unification must operate with available
resources; therefore, the present work does not consider
those older systems that would have required a substantial
redesign. For these legacy systems, the GDPR’s require-
ments were addressed with cheaper customized patching.
• Reusability (C7) is a classical software engineering goal.
As already mentioned with respect to C4 and C6, achiev-
ing the goal is constrained by many practical aspects,
however. At the software architecture level, reusability
connotes with concepts such as modularity, which intro-
duces also the dual concepts of cohesion and coupling. In
terms of data protection, the famous single responsibility
principle [29] provides a sensible goal; personal data
should be isolated into particular modules designed to
handle this type of data. Analogously to the infrastruc-
tural constraints, such isolation must balance the need to
modify and customize other software modules, however.
• Maintenance and support (C8) aspects must be also
taken into account. In addition to traditional maintenance
questions (such as implementing bug fixes and patching
online deployments), it is important to emphasize differ-
ent support services provided to customers. In general,
these imply a necessity to separate different realms and
roles from each other [30]. In other words, the archi-
tecture must conform with roles assigned to customers,
developers, system administrators, and support personnel.
By implication, C8 includes not only access control
mechanisms but also considerations related to logging.
• Distribution of personal data (C9) is the last but not the
least constraint. In addition to the distribution of personal
data at the infrastructural level (C5), personal data may
distribute across multiple places and levels of a software
architecture. Multiple modules may handle such data.
Also granularity must be addressed: multiple implemen-
tation units (such as classes and configuration files) may
deal with sensitive personal data. Given this background,
the design followed a simple but fundamental principle:
the lesser the distribution of personal data, the better the
solution for data protection. This principle connotes with
those more generally related to information security. The
principle can be further seen as a software architecture
equivalent to the GDPR’s data minimization principle.
D. An Example Architecture
A brief concrete example can be used to further elaborate
the constraints and the company’s general operating environ-
ment. Thus, Figure 1 displays a high-level example of a typical
SOA within the case company. The colors used represent the
sensitivity in the handling of sensitive personal data from
a software architecture perspective: a red color corresponds
with actual storage of such data, a yellow color illustrates the
delivery of personal data, and elements marked with a green
color are free from any handling of sensitive personal data.
A user (consumer) of the case company’s customer delivers
personal data (such as contact details) to the architecture
due to a subscription-based service offered by the customer.
There are two databases to which such data is stored, but
both of these are located within a single logical module.
Given Constraint C9, the data distribution is therefore smaller
compared to a solution in which personal data would be stored
also to the database used at the presentation layer of the
architecture. Given Constraint C5, the storing of personal data
is further isolated to separate servers. Given Constraint C8,
also administration is separated. Although this example SOA
is simple, fairly large changes are required due to the require-
ments elicited from the GDPR. These must operate within the
contextual limits imposed by Constraints C2, C4, C6, and C7.
   Cache and load balancing layer
Administrator
End user
Website servers (any number of) 
Web application
Service  
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  Load balancers 
Business logic
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Third-party integration 
Payment service Other businessservices
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Fig. 1. An Example Architecture
IV. REQUIREMENTS
A. Articles, Architectures, and Constraints
The GDPR contains ninety-nine articles (A) arranged into
eleven chapters. In what follows, a quick overview of the
regulation is presented in order to justify the subsequent
requirements elicitation. The brief discussion mainly pinpoints
a few particularly relevant articles for software architectures
(for more comprehensive legal discussion see [31], [11],
and [12], for instance). To provide a concise summary, these
are discussed in conjunction with the constraints and software
architecture design. When referring to a particular recital in
an article, the recital is placed in parenthesis. As an example:
the notation A32(1) refers to the first recital in Article A32.
The initial four articles define the regulation’s general
provisions, material scope, territorial scope, and definitions. In
essence, these state the obvious: the GDPR is about protecting
natural persons and their personal data within the EU in the
context of data processing by both automated and manual
means. In terms of territorial scope, it should be remarked
that the case company and its customers are operating within
the EU, although Constraint C1 implies that potential extrater-
ritorial considerations apply at least in principle. Among other
definitions and clarifications, Article A4 defines the concepts
of profiling and pseudonymization, which are both relevant
also for the case company. While the details are beyond the
scope of this paper, it can be remarked that pseudonymization
was implemented in accordance with existing suggestions (see,
in particular, [32]). Furthermore, A4(7) and A4(8) provide
the definitions for data controllers and data processors. While
these two concepts are difficult juridically [11], the interpre-
tation for the case company is clear: despite of the business
model, the company is both a controller and a processor.
Articles A5 and A6 define the principles and lawfulness.
Both are relevant for the case company’s SOAs. In essence,
particularly A5(1c), A5(1e), and A5(2) state that compliance
can be achieved by demonstrating that only a minimal amount
of relevant personal data is securely processed for a particular
purpose, and the data’s life cycle is well-controlled. Article
A6 continues by noting that personal data can be lawfully
processed only with a user’s consent or in case the processing
is backed by a contract, a legal obligation, or some related
exemption. Article A7 further clarifies the conditions for a
user’s consent. While together A6(1a) and A7 imply a clear
requirement for the case company, it should be underlined
that the company’s compliance is not relying on A6(1f) and
its much debated [31] concept of so-called legitimate interests.
Articles from A12 to A23 define the rights of data subjects.
To begin with, A12 sets the general principles for transparency
and users’ rights. While no technical details are enumerated,
A12(7) and A12(8) remark about the desirability of using
standardized icons for illustrating the intended processing of
personal data. In theory, these may be useful also in terms of
reusability (C7). Articles A13 and A14 define the information
to be delivered to users upon request. Particularly important
are the clauses about the period of data storage and the ending
of data processing. For the case company, these imply project-
specific solutions, which are challenging due to the variety
of customers (C1) and projects (C3). Common frameworks
and C7 can balance these challenges. Because a user needs to
generally make a request in order to exercise his or her rights,
also the case company’s support channels (C8) are involved.
Articles A16, A17, A18, and A19 define the rights for rec-
tification, erasure, and restriction. For software architectures
these imply different technical considerations about acknowl-
edgements, backups, and logs. In general, these considerations
mandate that the distribution of personal data (C9) within a
software architecture has already been properly addressed.
Articles A20 and A21 define the rights for data portability
and objection. In terms of the former, a noteworthy observa-
tion for software architectures is the emphasis on structured,
widely used, and generally machine-readable formats. While
no universally agreed format exists, a compliant architecture
should still be prepared to deliver requested personal data in a
well-defined format. A common interface is possible for A21.
Articles from A24 to A31 enumerate the obligations for data
processors and data controllers. Article A25 is particularly
important: it declares that rigorous data protection should
be applied by default, albeit in the limits of state-of-the-art
technical solutions (cf. C2) and implementation costs (cf. C4).
Article A30 is also important for the design of software
architectures: records should be kept from all processing
activities involving personal data. This bookkeeping necessity
is in line with the accountability criterion in A5(2). Regardless
of a particular article or its recital, a fundamental prerequisite
is that a software architecture is already well-manageable.
Finally, Articles A32 and A44 are worth pointing out.
The former explicitly aligns data protection with informa-
tion security. A conventional listing follows—from encryption
and pseudonymization to CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and
availability), and from there to risks and likelihoods. While
Articles A33 and A34 spell out the much discussed data breach
notification mandates, these are less relevant for a software
architecture design in the sense that notification functionality
should be built-in [33]. Article A44 together with the chapter
five in the regulation define the conditions via which personal
data of Europeans can be transmitted to outside of the EU.
B. Elicitation of Requirements
The preceding short discussion about the legal background
allows to elicit nine general requirements (R) for the case
company’s software architectures. These are enumerated in
Figure 2. Many of the requirements listed are accompanied
with their essential properties. Furthermore, Article A5(2) and
its accountability criterion can be attached to each requirement.
A selected set of minimal user stories (U) is also presented for
illustrative purposes. Even though a comprehensive collection
of stories was assembled for the actual implementation, the
few cases presented are important for underlining that user
stories are applicable also in the GDPR context. The point is
worth stressing because user stories are extensively used in
agile software development [34]. The nine requirements are:
• System security and privacy (R1) is the label used for the
first requirement. It includes data protection (A25) and
information security (A32). Therefore, this requirement
provides the fundamental basis for all other requirements
elicited. If a verification of CIA indicates some major
problems, the premises of all other requirements are
obviously threatened. The requirement also faces the
company’s operational constraints. Due to Constraint C1,
some customers may have additional requirements for
data protection, but the fundamental security aspects
should apply to all projects. For instance, access control
mechanisms must be implemented properly and security-
related maintenance must be guaranteed (C8). However,
it may also be that some particular customers require
further security guarantees. Such additional requirements
bring questions about technological choices (C2), pricing,
investments (C4), and reusability (C7). Finally, a large
distribution of personal data (C9) affects also security
considerations because there is also a large attack surface.
• Data minimization (R2) is a rather clear requirement
corresponding with A5(1c) and A25(1). Accordingly,
the handling and storing of personal data should be
minimized. Constraint C9 and more generally distributed
software architectures cause some difficulties for meeting
the requirement—it must be possible to show that all
elements of a software architecture deal with personal
data only minimally. What is more, it must be possible to
demonstrate a minimal use of personal data in the staging
environment (C5) used during development and testing.
• Consent control (R3) refers to a requirement for handling
personal data according to Articles A6 and A7. This
requirement is decomposed into the collection of users’
consents (R3.1), the abstract data structures used for
these (R3.2), and special considerations (A8) required for
children and their guardians (R3.3). The data structures
include timestamps upon which consents were received,
as well as a possibility to operate with digital signatures
required for strong authentication. In terms of constraints,
reusability (C7) and potential investments (C4) are worth-
while to remark. Due to Constraint C1, consents must be
collected also from users of old customers. Regarding
user stories, a couple of simple examples could spell:
– U3.1: As a user, I am able to give and cancel my
consent for the processing of my personal data.
– U3.2: As a guardian of an underage user registered
to a service, I am able to cancel my consent regard-
ing the processing of my child’s personal data.
• Data traceability (R4) is a requirement stemming partic-
ularly from A30. Given the mandated ability to demon-
strate compliance, traceability must include longitudinal
considerations, users’ requests, potential disclosures to
third-parties, and potential transfers of personal data to
outside of the EU. Careful logging is the obvious choice
for addressing the requirement. For implementation,
legacy systems (C6), maintenance and support (C8), and
distribution of personal data (in terms of both C5 and C9)
require attention. Reusable and flexible frameworks (C7)
engender some preferable synergies for implementation.
• User access (R5) refers to A15 and A20: users must
have access to their personal data in a sensible machine-
readable format and they have a right for data porta-
bility. In general, both articles can be addressed with
approximately the same amount of work; a user interface,
access controls, and a well-defined data format must be
implemented. Care should be taken to avoid accidentally
divulging personal data of other users [12], [35]. Like
with R2, distributed systems, relational databases, and
scattering of personal data (C5 and C9) bring further
challenges. A simple user story for R5 might read like:
– U5.1: As a user registered to a service, I am able to
view all data stored about me in an understandable
format, and transfer this data to another service.
• Data rectification (R6) covers A16. That is, users have
a right to correct data stored about them, including data
delivered to third-parties. In addition to the considerations
and challenges listed with regards to R5, it should be
noted that backups introduce a special concern; data
should be collected in all copies [25]. It must be also
ensured that restoring data does not overwrite changes.
• Data erasure (R7) stems from A17 and its famous “right
to be forgotten”. In addition to the points already dis-
cussed with respect to Requirements R5 and R6, it should
be also recalled that personal data must not be stored
longer than necessary, as mandated by A5(1e). A proper
solution to R4 helps at achieving also this demand.
A13
A7
A8
A30
A15
A20
A16
A17
A21
A18
A44
A32
A32(1) 
A32(2)
A6(1a)
A6
A25
A25(1) 
A25(2)
 
A5
A5(1c) 
A5(2) 
A5(1e) 
R1: System security and privacy
1.1: appropriate data protection measures
1.2: confidentiality
1.3: integrity
1.4: availability
1.5: resilience
1.6: timely restoration
1.7: process for testing privacy
R2: Data miminization
R3: Consent control
3.1: collecting consent
3.2: consent data model
3.3: consent of guardians
R4: Data traceability
4.1: log of processing events
4.2: log of GDPR requests
4.3: log of moving data outside the EU
4.3: log of third-party disclosures
R5: User access
5.1: viewing registered data
5.2: user interface for access requests
5.3: access to machine readable data
R7: Data erasure
7.1: deleting personal data
7.2: user interface for erasure requests
R6: Data rectification
6.1: updating personal data
6.2: user interface for update requests
R8: Data restrictions
8.1: restricted data
8.2: user interface for objections
R9: Physical location of data
Fig. 2. Elicited Requirements from the GDPR
• Data restrictions (R8) refers to A21 and its obligations
for data controllers to allow data subjects to object the
processing of their personal data, including but not lim-
ited to profiling. An objection again implies a request in
practice, so a user interface is required together with ac-
cess controls (R8.2). If the request is deemed as valid, the
data associated can no longer be processed, modified, or
deleted (A18). Thus, a particular logic is needed for han-
dling restricted data (R8.1). In terms of implementation,
this logic is analogous to the one used for consents (R3).
In fact, both a consent and potential restrictions must be
checked before processing personal data of data subjects.
• Physical location of data (R9) is the final requirement.
Even though the case company is not doing business
outside of the EU, it must be still known where personal
data is located geographically. Knowledge is explicit in
terms of the core software architecture, but C2 (tech-
nological dependency) may necessitate integration of
different cloud services. Fortunately, all decent providers
of these allow to specify the geographic location of
servers. Constraints C5 and C8 also breed some implicit
concerns. For instance, personal data may accidentally
spill to outside of the EU due to as innocent reasons as the
uses of version control and documentation systems during
software development. Given the low privacy awareness
among software developers in general [15], education
and instructions are the generic means to address these
concerns. A data protection officer mandated by A37
can help at this task. Another good option is to write
a detailed architectural description akin to this paper.
V. ARCHITECTURAL CHANGES
The nine requirements elicited from the GDPR provide
the basis for the changes required to the SOAs used in the
case company. In what follows, the principal architectural
changes and choices are thus elaborated. Requirements R1
and R9 are excluded from the elaboration. The former sets the
general security and privacy requirements that span the whole
architecture—and beyond, whereas the latter is a unique re-
quirement that cannot be explicitly addressed by the means of
architectural design. Given these remarks, Figure 3 shows an
overview of the redesign changes induced by the requirements.
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Fig. 3. An Overview of the Architectural Changes
There are four requirements that imply a user interface
through which data subjects can exercise their rights. While
these can be dressed with project-specific themes and styles,
the logic is similar for all instances. Therefore, a common
GDPR-request interface is used for R5, R6, R7, and R8. The
interface should not be interpreted as the only possible way
for users to exercise their rights: if necessary, requests can be
processed also manually based on inquiries received through
other channels. From a software architecture perspective, the
logic of processing the requests should be the same either way.
Web
server 
GDPR-request interface
GDPR-request service 
Core personal
data module
Other web interfaces
Personal data
event log
Administrator
user interface
Request API
End user
Administrator
Fig. 4. A Design for GDPR Requests
Because users are registered to the services offered via
subscriptions, basic access control mechanisms apply. Due to
abuse risks and potential legal requirements, these are not
enough, however. The GDPR-request interface is therefore
accompanied with a specific GDPR-request service accessed
by administrators through a light user interface of their own. In
other words, an administrator approves or declines a GDPR-
specific request made by a user already authenticated to
the public facing systems. The mapping between these two
interfaces is further illustrated in Figure 4. In-between the
two interfaces is a specific application programming interface
(API) for handling the request-response dynamics. In theory,
automation might be possible through this API, but, in prac-
tice, the dynamics are delayed; a user makes a request, which
is later handled by a given service-specific administrator (that
is, a support person). The only exception is Requirement R5
for which also automation might be considered. In any case,
delayed requests require storing these to persistent storage.
Because of the data traceability requirement (R4), storage is
also explicitly required regardless of the handling dynamics.
As earlier (see Subsection III-D), the colors of the databases
in Figures 3 and 4 connote with the sensitivity of personal
data. As can be seen, the request-specific databases are marked
with an orange color; some personal data must be stored to
these databases for adequately handling the requests, but the
scope of this data is limited. The varying scope or depth of the
personal data leads to an important architectural design choice:
the handling and storage of all truly sensitive personal data is
isolated into a specific core personal data module (CPDM).
For instance, the databases holding information about GDPR-
requests may contain user names and email addresses, whereas
those within the CPDM may hold users’ real names or, in the-
ory, even their social security numbers. While this distinction
between “regular” and sensitive data is commonly made [33],
it should be further noted that the distinction also follows the
different theoretical levels of pseudonymization [32]. In other
words, the CPDM holds all information from which a user
can be directly identified. Although R2 is difficult to address
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Fig. 5. A Messaging Service Bus
in general, this distinction provides the architectural basis
for addressing the GDPR’s data minimization requirement.
The centralization also helps in meeting the general design
principle about reducing the distribution of personal data (C9).
Because of the data restriction requirement (R8), operations
(additions, deletions, or updates) in the CPDM’s database(s)
need to verify whether users have placed restrictions for these.
An analogous logic applies to the consents (R3). Thus, further
isolation is used for R3 (consent center) and R8 (restriction
center). The CPDM consults these two centers before access-
ing or altering its underlying database(s). The implementation
of these follows closely the ideas behind the so-called MyData
framework [14]. Therefore, the centers may be easily altered
to use also consent services provided by external operators.
As for the collection and potential cancellation of consents,
these can occur either within the architecture itself or through
services implemented in the specific consent center. The
latter services can be implemented in accordance with well-
established authentication and authorization protocols. The
notable examples in this regard are OAuth and OpenID. As the
data structures about consents (R3.2) holds also the dates upon
which these were received from users, it is possible to also
address the GDPR’s general mandate about fixed retention pe-
riods (A5). For instance, it is possible to periodically scan the
database of the consent center to ensure that the architecture
does not commit “the sin of storing data forever” (cf. [28]).
If such automatic scanning indicates particularly old records,
requests about consents can be resend, or, in some cases, the
personal data can be outright removed in an automated manner.
In terms of the overall software architecture, it is important
to continue by noting that each business logic service (BLS)
needs to have a reference to the sensitive data stored to the
CPDM. These services are internal to the case company and
do not refer to the services of the company’s customers. For
instance, in Fig. 1 a BLS handles an integration with a third-
party payment service. For this reason, the CPDM and the
business logic services can be reasonably also placed into the
same logical module (see Fig. 3). To ensure data integrity
(R1.3) and traceability (R4), changes made through the GDPR-
request interface must propagate to the databases of each BLS.
To ensure that R7 is properly met, all data must be deleted,
regardless whether this data is sensitive or not. Likewise, the
CPDM must be able to collect the data from each BLS in order
to comply with R5 and R6. The same applies with respect
to R8: if a user has restricted the use of his or her data in
order to pursue or defend legal claims (A18), also the data
held by each BLS must be frozen. The required functionality
is implemented in the architecture by using a message bus
through which the CPDM broadcasts the requests to each BLS
that has registered to the bus, and, therefore, declared using
non-sensitive but still personal data of users. By excluding the
consent and restriction centers for the sake of clarity, the logic
of the broadcasting functionality is illustrated in Figure 5.
The final architectural design choice is about the traceability
of personal data (R4) and the logging required to implement
this requirement. In essence, the guiding question is: what
should be logged and how? To begin with the more important
what-question, the obvious starting point is that no sensitive
personal data whatsoever ends up in the logs. By asserting that
this necessary condition holds, there are four types of events
that should be logged according to the requirements elicitation.
First, the processing of personal data should be logged
with sufficient detail (R4.1). In the case company’s software
architecture such logging implies verifying that each BLS
is implementing logging with sufficient rigor. Particular at-
tention is required to ensure that logging is systematically
and correctly implemented in those cases involving automated
decision-making and profiling (A22). Second, all events about
GDPR requests should be logged (R4.2). As can be seen from
Figure 5, this type of logging is rigorously implemented in
the CPDM module. Because the GDPR mentions in several
occasions that undue delays must be avoided, this type of
logging is necessary to guarantee the legal rights of both data
subjects and the case company. Given the message bus, this
logging not only follows the general “request-log-process-log”
logic often used in the data protection (privacy) context [36],
but also accounts for the activities of each BLS. Third and
fourth, all disclosures to third-parties are logged alongside the
supply of data to outside of the European Union. As said,
no data is presently transmitted outside of the union, and
a disclosure to third-parties is a rare event. Therefore, the
logging for R4.3 and R4.4 is mainly implemented to ensure
an audit trail for potential accidents involving data spillage.
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Fig. 6. Logging Architecture
As for the how-question, centralization is again a sensible
design goal: administrators should be able to access all logs
through a single interface. Because no personal data is stored
to the logs, a so-called ELK-stack (Elastic, Logstash, and
Kibana) offers a plausible implementation choice. This stack
is illustrated in Figure 6. In essence: an administrator uses a
visualization tool (Kibana) for analyzing the logs based on
a text-based search engine (Elasticsearch), which relies on
an input stream (Logstash) for collecting the logs from each
server given a service (Filebeat) installed to these servers.
Finally, it is worthwhile to briefly return to Requirement R1.
While the requirement’s information security side—including
the fundamental CIA-triad—is outside of the scope of this
paper, the data protection side still warrants a remark. To
improve the prerequisites for testing (R1.7), as well as other
related imperatives [25], the whole software architecture was
audited by annotating all locations and services that handle
personal data. All of these can be thus located automatically
through static analysis given the annotations @PersonalData
and @PersonalDataHandler used during the auditing process.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Questions Answered
This paper used a grounded theory approach for address-
ing the GDPR’s main implications for software development
SMEs. The approach was framed around constraints, require-
ments, and software architectures. The answers to the corre-
sponding research questions can be summarized as follows:
• RQ1: There are many practical constraints that typical
software development SMEs face when implementing
changes required by the GPDR to SOAs. Given the case
company’s business model and operating environment,
the paper identified nine practical constraints. These
can be roughly grounded into three categories: business
(C1, C2, C3, C4), infrastructure (C5, C9), and software
engineering (C6, C7, C8) constraints. All three groups
are important for requirements engineering. While the
business constraints have stolen much of the attention in
media, different infrastructural and software engineering
constraints are arguably more important when implement-
ing various changes induced by the GDPR in practice.
• RQ2: Despite of the GDPR’s immense length and scope,
only nine relevant requirements were elicited for the case
company (see Fig. 2). While many of these include their
specific subcategories, the bottom line is that the GDPR’s
demands for software architectures are addressable with
fairly generic requirements at least in the SME-SOA
context studied. The requirements elicited can be grouped
into five categories: privacy and security (R1), data min-
imization (R2), users’ rights (R3, R5, R6, R7, R8), trace-
ability (R4), and physical location of personal data (R9).
• RQ3: Given the constraints identified, the requirements
elicited were addressable with relatively simple changes
to the already existing software architectures. The main
technical solutions are further summarized in Figure 7.
In general, user interfaces, isolation of personal data,
access control mechanisms, pseudonymization, logging,
and annotations were the biggest implementation changes
required. Although the changes themselves are specific to
the case company, the architectural design choices may
generalize also to other software development SMEs.
B. Limitations and Challenges
A notable limitation relates to generalizability. The paper’s
explicit framing to SMEs obviously limits generalizability.
The further framing to SOAs limits it further. The GDPR
may place rather different requirements for a SME operating
in the Internet-of-things domain, for instance. That said, the
generalizability problems should not be exaggerated. As the
MyData framework has demonstrated [14], general design
patterns (such as the ones in Fig. 3 and Fig. 5) are applicable
in many different contexts and industry sectors. Another
point about generalizability relates to the fact that only those
GDPR articles were considered that have clear implications
for software architectures. While this framing is common in
the requirements engineering domain [23], it conceals the
GDPR’s many non-technical requirements that are important
also for SMEs [5]. To this end, concepts such as functional and
non-functional requirements could be used to systematically
analyze and categorize the individual articles and their recitals.
The argumentation-solution layering discussed in Section II
provides also a good way to discuss a few practical challenges
and problems faced. Validation of the requirements elicited
is the primary issue at the argumentative layer. Besides con-
forming with the GDPR itself, the nine requirements elicited
should generally be consistent, unambiguous, implementable,
verifiable, and traceable [3], [18]. Because concrete solutions
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were implemented, most of the requirements satisfy these
validation attributes. The only exception is R1. It is seldom—if
ever—possible to write down a requirement (set) that would
be specific enough to capture all possible threats and risks.
As has been suggested [9], a possible path forward might
be to combine the GDPR’s requirements with those from
other standards, such as the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard (PCI DSS). More generally, security-specific
standards and governmental guidelines (such as the Finnish
VAHTI) should arguably be augmented with material on data
protection and privacy. The point applies also to software and
requirements engineering standards, such as the ISO/IEC/IEEE
29148:2018 for software life cycle management.
Four noteworthy challenges can be mentioned at the so-
lution layer. First, it remains somewhat unclear whether the
pseudonymization solution is sufficient to ensure the “ap-
propriate safeguards” mentioned in several occasions in the
GDPR. While all personal data is further encrypted and
everything is transmitted through the transport layer security
protocol, the practical challenge rather relates to the logical
fact that personal data is not pseudonymized at the level
of the whole architecture due to the references between the
CPDM and the business logic services. Pseudonymization can
be guaranteed with respect to each BLS, however. Given the
company’s business model, this guarantee seems sufficient.
Second, it has been argued that annotation and static
analysis are not enough because these miss the purpose of
using personal data [37]. While the pseudonymization solution
partially addresses also this concern, it must be acknowledged
that the intention of using personal data is not made explicit
in the architecture. A possible solution might be an additional
authorization module that each BLS would be mandated to use
prior to registering to the broadcasting service bus in Figure 5.
Third, distributed software architectures seem a double-
edged sword when it comes to data protection and privacy.
While these provide great opportunities for modularity and
server isolation [13], these also increase the risk that personal
data accidentally spills to unintended servers, modules, third-
parties, or geographic locations. The last problem follows.
Fourth, requirements should be traceable through a whole
software development life cycle [3], and even through a whole
software life cycle, from the first working release to the
eventual deprecation. Insofar as practical software engineering
is considered, this traceability mandate is particularly interest-
ing. As was noted in Subsection III-C, a particular concern
in the present work relates to the staging environment used
during development and testing, but the problem goes beyond
such environments. For instance, the logging architecture in
Figure 6 rests on the assertion that no sensitive personal data
is logged. While the assertion can be assured to hold in the
case company, the example is illustrative in the sense that also
various software development practices, tools, and frameworks
have direct consequences for complying with the GDPR.
C. Further Work
In addition to addressing the limitations and practical chal-
lenges discussed, a couple of prolific paths can be noted
for further work. The first relates to the notions such as
“privacy-by-design” and their practical software engineering
equivalents. The literature on software development and soft-
ware architectures has long enjoyed a tradition of excellent
textbooks and reference guidebooks. The examples include
various monographs on design patterns, code smells, and
related topics. Yet, very little has been written about design
patterns for privacy and data protection, or about “privacy
smells” and related topics. The second path involves the
question on how privacy and data protection requirements and
their implementations could be systematically tested. Although
static analysis was used for meeting R1.7, further research is
required for developing new innovative testing and auditing
techniques. These are necessary for reaching the GDPR’s
goal (A42) about certification for privacy and data protection.
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